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    <title>Passkeys on Napat&#39;s Inverse Blog</title>
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      <title>Two-Factor Authentication Is Not What You Think</title>
      <link>/2026-03-27-two-factor-authentication-is-not-what-you-think/</link>
      <pubDate>Fri, 27 Mar 2026 13:15:22 +0700</pubDate>
      <guid>/2026-03-27-two-factor-authentication-is-not-what-you-think/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Most people believe they understand 2FA. You have a password. You have an app that generates a six-digit code. Two things. Two factors. You are protected.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;They are not entirely wrong. But they are right about the mechanics and wrong about what those mechanics actually guarantee.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The original idea behind multi-factor authentication was elegant. Security researchers observed that any single secret can leak. Passwords get stolen. Databases get breached. So they proposed combining secrets from fundamentally different &lt;em&gt;categories&lt;/em&gt;: something you &lt;em&gt;know&lt;/em&gt;, something you &lt;em&gt;have&lt;/em&gt;, something you &lt;em&gt;are&lt;/em&gt;. The key insight was not the number of steps — it was orthogonality. A thief who steals your password from a server breach still cannot log in because they do not physically possess your phone. The factors are independent. Compromise one, and the other remains intact.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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